When does delegation improve credibility? : Central Bank independ ence and the separation of power /
Keefer, Philip.
When does delegation improve credibility? : Central Bank independ ence and the separation of power / Philip Keefer and David Stasvage. - Oxford : Centre for the Study of African Economics, 1998. - 22 p. ; 30 cm. - Working paper series ; 98-18 .
Includes Bibliographic references.
Banks and banking.
Banks and banking, Cental-- Law and legislation.
332.11 KEE
When does delegation improve credibility? : Central Bank independ ence and the separation of power / Philip Keefer and David Stasvage. - Oxford : Centre for the Study of African Economics, 1998. - 22 p. ; 30 cm. - Working paper series ; 98-18 .
Includes Bibliographic references.
Banks and banking.
Banks and banking, Cental-- Law and legislation.
332.11 KEE